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標題: [時事討論] 理性施政逆民情專家治國不允長林行止 [打印本頁]

作者: felicity2010 時間: 2011-11-22 09:16 AM 標題: 理性施政逆民情專家治國不允長林行止

本帖最後由 felicity2010 於 2011-11-22 09:18 AM 編輯

理性施政逆民情專家治國不允長  林行止# y. k4 K- d. \

一、希臘和意大利政府換班，新上台的不是政客而俱為學有所長的所謂「技術型」專家（Technocrat）。政客與專家的管治手法有什麼不同？簡單而言，前者憑「民調」治國，在人人愛吃「免費午餐」並且吃上癮的年代，他們只好大花「未來錢」進而「未來沒有的錢」，以滿足人民（選民）的訴求，終於弄得一窮二白，債主臨門……。後者則根據專業知識釐定政策，這等於其施政符合教科書的教導而可能（事實上是肯定）與民意民情背馳，結果治績比政客更差，不足為奇。當希臘和意大利改由專家執政的消息公布後，市場的積極反應不足一日，因為「見慣世面」的機構投資者知道專家治國於事無補，這從她們的債券孳息很快便重回七厘水平（風險增債券被拋售）可見。

專家的學養豐富，而學術並非不能治國，問題是學者專家不僅都是聰明人還是理性人，這使他們的「公共政策」難有作為！行為經濟學大家Amos Tversky生前常說他研究的是「人類愚行」（I Study Natural Stupidity﹝天生愚笨﹞），可知在學者眼中，人大都非理性因而經常作出錯誤決策。面對非理性的「民情」，理性的專家真的束手無策。
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二、希臘和意大利政客淡出專家走出前台（料有更多國家走上這條路），表面看是政客失勢專家奪權，實際上是在玩弄權術上遠較專家精明狡猾的政客，見事無可為，把專家「擺上枱」；這即是說，政客見他們的選民怨聲沖天天天上街，沒有推出「苦行式」（austere）經濟政策的環境與勇氣，遂捧出專家應變。值得注意的是，希臘和意大利的「今上」俱非民選而是政客協商（國會同意總統批准）推舉，這意味政客仍掌握議會，民意授予的「統治」（Rule）權力未變；而被政客推出的專家只有「治理」（Govern）之責。這種本質，令在民主社會專家之治多半以失敗收場。以目前的經濟條件和民情，「勒緊褲帶等於對慘淡的經濟落井下石」（Austerity will sink the Economy），專家尤其是經濟學家不易獲民意支持、難安於位，底因在此。眾所周知，凱恩斯理論有百般不足，然而，在經濟困頓中卻是應時救急治標的靈丹。本報讀者都瞭然於胸，現在正是政府對經濟注資的最適時刻（希望經濟由是恢復生機、活力進而創造就業及增加稅入……，雖然許多時這是一廂情願的「推理」，但捨此之外，又有什麼辦法？）；時勢如此，厲行節約肯定是死路一條，而政客現在便把看似憂國憂民胸有成竹的專家引上這條路！

筆者常說美國經濟學家幾乎囊括諾貝爾經濟學獎，其經濟學人才濟濟，不容否認，但何以美國經濟如此不濟且為當今環球經濟危機的禍首？答案十分顯然。

筆者對專家治國大有保留的理由有二—' Z8 }0 ]. ]% X' @; V5 M! s- @
甲、政客的智囊中有不少學究型的專家，惟他們的意見大多不被當權者採用，因為「俯順民情」更重要，以「民情」為「票源」，即使訴求非理性、不合理，爭取他們一票的政客亦會設法滿足之。專家的理論均有所本，且反覆求證，多能自成一家、有益世道，問題是在某段時期與「民情相逆」，令照足學理制定的經濟政策「不適時」，學者專家之言遂聊備一格，可壯「觀瞻」而已。) v6 p1 ]2 a0 y9 @' y( z
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乙、技術官僚當道，以目前希臘及意大利的財困，行的肯定是減福利削薪金加稅項增稅率及賣祖產的苦行式政策，這與「書上所說」，完全吻合，因為非如此無以「開源節流」；可是，你以為希意人民會乖乖聽從政府的指示嗎？答案當然是否定的。他們「不聽話」並非沒道理，以資本主義行之有年，渣滓沉積，「利上不利下」，資本家對政府稅入的「貢獻」愈來愈少（以美國為例，一九五○年，企業利得稅約佔總經濟產值〔Factax/GDP〕百分之六點五，去年已降至百分之二點五左右，稅率雖仍高達百分之三十五，但有稅務專家幫忙，很少企業交足稅，這正是人民群情汹湧上街高呼不公平的底因！），而金融業「輸打贏要」，更令「百分之九十九」怒火中燒……。還有，減福利減薪酬應由公僕帶頭，但這些「建制中的暴君」怎會把「先天下之憂而憂」具體化?!值得注意的是，普羅人民即使不必交薪俸稅，亦是間接稅的納稅人（百億富翁的煙稅和汽油稅與窮光蛋同！），這等於說，他們有納稅的義務，因此亦要享應得（政客上台前、競選中對他們的承諾）的權利。如今當國的專家逼他們勒緊褲帶，他們又怎會做「順民」？

「苦行式」經濟政策還會闖出不僅僅限於示威遊行而是「官逼民反」的大禍。一九三○年，學者型的布魯寧（Heinrich Bruning, 1885-1970）出任德國總理（1930-32），為了化解紓緩源自華爾街的經濟大蕭條（當年的經濟海嘯席捲全世界），在總統興登堡及國會的全力支持下，落實了一系列「苦行式」的緊急政策，反對者被視為叛國，警察絕不手軟對付「暴民」，結果希特勒於一九三二年登台拜相……。tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb6 y# M3 b6 z$ e& j' _- \
大約二十年前，筆者曾為短文述說專家學者從政難有成的因果（縷列不少實例附有名表可惜一時無法找出）。學者當權便能「大治」，大學裏有這樣多學富五車的大學者，天下還會不太平繁盛嗎？可惜現實並非如此……。賓州大學史學家麥道高數年前有《上天下地—太空時代政治史》（W. A. McDougall:《The Heavens and the Earth- A Political History of the Space Age》）一書，指出蘇聯所以能首先成功「登天」，主因是她為世上第一個實行技術專家治國（Technocracy）的國家，政府決策層（政治局）中工程師和各類專家佔絕大多數，可是，其科技有所成但經濟則乏善足陳……。事實上，意大利亦曾由專家治國，經濟學教授且曾在央行任要職的詹比（C.A. Cimpi）出任總理，但不足一年（一九九三─九四）便落台；希臘央行總裁、經濟學者佐洛塔斯（X.Zolotas）亦曾拜相，可是亦只有一年（八九—九○）便鞠躬下台！學者專家被政客玩弄於股掌間的迹象甚明顯。公仔箱論壇; j0 f& [# k  B* {1 t& _

意大利的經濟（和政治）問題，不必學者專家，關心時事的普通人都了解，但「看得懂」不等於便能解決，科大雷鼎鳴教授昨天在本報的大作，以具體事實，清楚地剖析了意大利的病源，結論指杜賓（提出「杜賓稅」和「杜賓的Q」的經濟學大家）的高足、當朝的總理蒙蒂（MarioMonti）「若有足夠的意志，不用太顧慮政治因素，意大利應有實力化解這場債務危機……」。確是的評。和他的前任一樣，筆者相信蒙蒂有為國家解困的意志和決心，問題是，亦與他的前任一樣，作為政治人物（學者當政搖身變為政治人物），他不可能不「顧慮政治因素」，結果為何，不問可知！TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。' Y! ]( c7 Q5 |

新人事新作風，特別是專家取代政客，令「外行人」憧憬其施政足以使病木發新枝，但看看希臘、意大利、西班牙甚至法國債券孳息與德國的差距仍在擴大，便可知學者專家亦難為無米之炊—這些國家不僅僅是「無米」，而是欠下人家太多自己糧倉和田裏沒有的「米」！2 I) z; l7 g5 l1 x2 e+ Y3 C1 E+ J
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三、順便寫幾句。剛落台的希臘前總理佐治．帕潘德里歐（Georgios Papandreou, 1952-），出身「藍血政治世家」，其祖其父（哈佛經濟系，為名家葛爾布萊斯〔J.K. Galbraith〕同窗兼好友）皆曾任總理。一九六七年四月二十一日，希臘發生軍事政變，叛軍衝進總理官邸，用槍指着當時不足十五歲的佐治，逼其父（代總理兼國防部長）交出政權；後者見兒子性命受威脅，乖乖就範，希臘從此進入七年的所謂「上校治國」。公仔箱論壇* y2 r9 Z/ s2 x: l( B' D" g
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事隔四十四年，於○九年被選民捧上總理寶座的帕潘德里歐（他在加拿大、美國、英國和瑞典受教育，是學者型的政客），去周在布魯塞爾「無形之槍」威脅下，不得不退位讓「專」；和政變軍人不同，歐盟首腦逼他落台不是要直接奪政權，而是要他們認為會強制落實「苦行式」政策的專家上台。希臘爛透且已窮透根，真正是諸神難救，政客固然束手，專家多半會以焦頭爛額黯然收場！

作者: felicity2010 時間: 2011-11-22 09:34 AM

本帖最後由 felicity2010 於 2011-11-22 09:38 AM 編輯 tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb6 H* i2 s' L7 ~$ H1 t* L* d
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Can Italy Be Saved?  Michael Spence7 Z( ]- ?" l  i$ e" _# h

TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。8 j3 V( Z4 L* o3 H, f
As the economist Mario Monti’s new government takes office in Italy, much is at stake – for the country, for Europe, and for the global economy. If reforms falter, public finances collapse, and anemic growth persists, Italy’s commitment to the euro will diminish as the perceived costs of membership come to outweigh the benefits. And Italy’s defection from the common currency – unlike that of smaller countries, like Greece – would threaten theeurozone to the core.
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Italy is a large economy, with annual GDP of more than $2 trillion. Its public debt is 120% of GDP, or roughly$2.4 trillion, which does not include the liabilities of a pension system in need of significant adjustments to reflect an aging population and increased longevity. As a result, Italy has become the world’s third-largest sovereign-debt market.
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But rising interest rates are causing the debt-service burden to become onerous and politically unsustainable. Furthermore, Italy must refinance €275 billion($372 billion) of its debt in the next six months, while investors, seeking to reduce their financial exposure to the country, are driving the yield on Italian ten-year bonds to prohibitively high levels – currently above 7%.( a3 h$ r8 u1 y. ?2 k0 D
The need to refinance outstanding debt is not the only challenge. Domestic and foreign bondholders, especially banks, have experienced capital losses, which have damaged balance sheets, capital adequacy, and confidence. The trade and current-account deficits are large and rising, probably reflecting a loss of competitiveness and productivity relative to Germany and France, two of Italy’s largest trading partners.Moreover, economic growth has been slow for the past decade, and is not accelerating, which will make it difficult to lower the public-debt burden even with fiscal consolidation.5 _3 F( ?$ ^7 X% d3 T  T. |0 ^% ]

Italy’s low growth rates reflect several factors, including labor-market rigidities, public-sector under-investment in the science and technology base of the economy, limitations on competition in certain sectors, and an extended period of structural adjustment to the eurozone environment.
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But Italy has significant strengths as well. Aggregate debt (government, household, non-financial corporations, and financial institutions) is slightly more than 315% of GDP, similar to Switzerland (313%),France (323%), the United States (296%), and even Germany (285%), all 2009numbers. But household debt is very low, at less than 50% of GDP. Moreover, along-standing pattern of high household savings, in the range of 17%-30% of income, means that individual and household net worth is higher than in most advanced countries.5.39.217.77:88983 J, a- Z+ V' [) T. h/ D+ V0 H1 l

That is not all. The businesses and industries of central and northern Italy are efficient, innovative,and globally integrated. And budget deficits were held in check during and after the crisis, unlike in many other advanced countries. Of course, while this was necessary, given the high initial public-debt burden, it limited counter-cyclical stimulus and impeded growth.

Italy’s crisis comes at a time of heightened risk for key countries (for example, a hard landing in China, or persistently high unemployment in the US). In assessing such risks,it is useful to focus on three variables: resources, competence, and will. Does a country have the resources to address the problems that it faces? Do policymakers have the experience and expertise to implement effective reforms?Do the authorities recognize the need to act decisively and aggressively?6 \7 j( ^! n; D/ x

Resources come first. If the resources are inadequate, the outcome will be bad,regardless of competence or will, unless there is some sort of external help.Likewise, political will is irrelevant without the competence to translate it into effective policies.5.39.217.77:8898, {4 _7 h! @6 A9 F; j! W
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It seems to me that in several important cases, including Italy, the US, and China, there is a relatively favorable scenario and a much less attractive one,distinguished largely by the effectiveness of the policy responses. Unlike Greece, where resources are deficient (giving rise only to unattractive scenarios), these countries’ resources are adequate, but either competence or political will (or some combination of the two) is in doubt, though analysts’ assessments vary widely.

For Italy, that means that the health of its consolidated balance sheet can be used in conjunction with reforms and parameter shifts in the pension system to restore fiscal balance and boost growth over time. Three things are required: a comprehensive reform program that meets the adjustment challenges head-on, political backing for that program, and time to implement enough of it to establish the credibility needed to lower the high risk premium on Italian debt., |- O# ^8 A9 b/ e4 x
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With the first two requirements dependent on Italy’s turbulent domestic politics, investors are increasingly unwilling to bet on the relatively favorable scenario, which means that Italy does not have time. Rising yields could undercut the fiscal-stabilization and economic-growth program before it can be fully implemented. And, as yields rise, the adequacy of the country’s resources becomes questionable or worse.TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。" {  [) Z9 b3 }9 b& f# h( y
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What is needed is a financial circuit breaker, in the form of a transitional lender of last resort. This would allow the reform programs to shift the balance of risk back toward the favorable scenario.5.39.217.77:88988 B+ M+ h  B  ~7 k5 L7 M
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There is, however, a final risk factor. The type of determined intervention designed to prevent the run-up in bond yields may not be forthcoming, owing to a concern within the eurozone core, led by Germany, that unconditional, aggressive action by a lender of last resort would undercut the incentive – and hence the political will – to undertake the required reforms.5.39.217.77:8898# \( `) W4 f1 t( b
TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。5 j4 d$ {. \1 b/ j
The sequencing problem is obvious: a commitment conditional on reform progress will not bring back private investors immediately, because it does not reduce the perceived risk of substantial political obstacles to implementing the necessary measures. Only bold and largely unconditional commitments by both the European Union and Italy can break this dangerous impasse. Absent either one, the risk of a sequential unraveling of eurozone public finances and a global economic downturn will remain high.. [6 s& c; Z4 G+ _0 i, V
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Michael Spence, a Nobel laureate in economics, is Professor of Economics at New York University’s Stern School of Business, Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution,Stanford University. His latest book is The Next Convergence – The Future of Economic Growth in a Multispeed World

歡迎光臨公仔箱論壇 (http://5.39.217.77:8898/)